See also Young 1971: Marshall McLuhan, moral panics and moral indignation by McLaughlin, E.
McLaughlin, E. (2014). See also Young 1971: Marshall McLuhan, moral panics and moral 
indignation. Theoretical Criminology: an international journal, 18(4), pp. 422-431. doi: 
10.1177/1362480614557207 
City Research Online
Original citation: McLaughlin, E. (2014). See also Young 1971: Marshall McLuhan, moral panics 
and moral indignation. Theoretical Criminology: an international journal, 18(4), pp. 422-431. doi: 
10.1177/1362480614557207 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/15286/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
1 
 
“See also Young, 1971: Marshall McLuhan, moral panics and moral indignation” 
 
Eugene McLaughlin, Theoretical Criminology, 2014, Vol. 18(4) pp. 422– 431 
 
 
Author details: 
 
Eugene McLaughlin is Professor of Criminology and member of the Centre of Law, Justice and 
Journalism at City University London. His current research focuses on trial-by-media, mediatised 
justice and scandal 
 
Email: e.mclaughlin@city.ac.uk 
557207TCR0010.1177/ 
Abstract 
 
Despite the fact that he introduced the concept into the sociology of deviance, Jock 
Young never claimed ownership of ‘moral panic’. There is little to no evidence suggest 
that he felt the need to keep up with the burgeoning literature on ‘moral panics studies’; 
rather, in much of this literature, his name is all but invisible, reduced to ‘See also Young, 
1971’. This essay begins with a review of Jock Young’s original use of ‘moral panic’ 
before discussing how he subsequently rejected the term, and then reflecting on why and 
how he re-engaged with it. My position is that Jock Young was ambivalent about how the 
term was subsequently developed and transformed into what he viewed as: an incredulous 
‘left idealist’ reaction to morally challenging issues; a mechanical sociological 
model used to decide on whether something was or was not a ‘boil-in-the-bag’ moral 
panic; and finally a dismissive journalistic judgement. In all these ‘moral panic for dummies’ 
usages, for Young, the volatile energizing moral dynamics of ‘action + reaction’ 
have been lost as has his nuanced appreciation of the shifting cultural significance of 
moral panic. Perhaps most significantly, the core dynamic of ‘moral indignation’ and its 
channelling—concerns that are present in all of Jock Young’s work—have likewise been 
lost in common usage of moral panic. 
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Introduction 
 
“This is what a moral panic looks like. And we’re bang-slap in the middle of one right 
now. Obesity, especially childhood obesity: we are obsessed with it. Who’s fat, 
why are they fat, who’s to blame, and what are we going to do about it?” 
(Belfast Telegraph, 18 July 2014) 
 
“The UK government’s announcement of a public inquiry into decades-old allegations of 
a paedophile ring operating within public institutions has ramped up fears over the 
prevalence of child abuse and the extent to which parliament, the police and the 
judiciary have been ‘covering it up’. So while the inquiry has been packaged 
as a sober reappraisal of neglected evidence, it has whipped up yet another 
moral panic.” (Spiked, 1 August 2014) 
 
 
 
The DrugTakers  
 
In The Drugtakers: The Social Meaning of Drug Use (1971: 169), Young’s study of 
drug taking in late 1960s Notting Hill, he develops an ‘explanatory framework capable of 
analysing the moral career of the drugtaker’. He is perplexed by the intensity of the social 
reaction to particular types of relatively harmless drug takers, namely those supposedly 
leading hedonistic lifestyles. An explanation was forged out of labelling and anomie theories. 
Young turned to Howard Becker’s notion of moral crusaders who manned the moral 
barricades and perhaps, more importantly, AK Cohen’s (1965: 6) idea of the righteous 
moral indignation that certain forms of deviance provoke in the law-abiding: 
The dedicated pursuit of culturally approved goals, the eschewing of interdicted but tantalizing 
goals, the adherence to normatively sanctioned means—these imply a certain self-restraint, 
effort, discipline, inhibition. What is the effect of the spectacle of others who, though their 
activities do not manifestly damage our own interests, are morally undisciplined, who give 
themselves up to idleness, self-indulgence, or forbidden vices? What effect does the propinquity 
of the wicked have on the peace of mind of the virtuous? 
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Cohen identifies four possible responses of the upright citizen to ‘the propinquity of the 
wicked’. First, s/he can become even more virtuous. Second, s/he can make a virtue of 
tolerance of the human failings of others. Third, s/he might be tempted into and embrace 
immorality. The final response is what interests Young. This is where morally indignant 
others unite 
 
in righteous puritanical wrath to mete out punishment to the deviants, not so much to stamp out 
their deviant behavior, as to re-affirm the central importance of conformity as the basis for 
judging men and to reassure himself and others of his attachment to goodness. 
(Cohen, 1965: 7) 
 
Young extends Cohen’s Durkheimian inspired model by noting how moral crusaders, 
experts, law enforcement agencies and most importantly the news media feed off and 
fuel ‘moral indignation’. He proceeds to construct one of the first accounts of the pivotal 
role played by the media in broadcasting and channelling the ‘natural’ moral indignation 
generated by certain forms of crime and deviance (Cohen and Young, 1973; Young, 
1971, 1974). For Young (1974: 254) the ideological and commercial imperatives for the 
news media in a capitalist society coalesce around the production of the impression that 
there is a moral consensus. The news media, are 
 
“the guardians of consensus: that is the major providers of information and actions, events, 
groups, and ideas they forge this information in a closed consensual image … they mobilise a 
specifiable conceptual machinery to maintain the plausibility structures of the consensual 
universe.” (Young, 1974: 244) 
 
In so doing, the news media claim to act as ‘the voice of the people’ and the diviner 
of the ‘moral centre’ of society. For Young (1974: 239) a ‘tight network of influences’ 
holds news reporting ‘within a tight consensual pattern’. The most important aspect of 
this is pressure to produce ‘newsworthy’ stories 
 
“ that are atypical, presents them in a stereotypical fashion, and contrasts them against a backcloth 
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of normality which is over typical. The atypical is elected because the everyday or humdrum is 
not interesting to read or watch; it has little news value.” (1971: 179) 
 
However statistical unusualness is not in itself sufficient to make something newsworthy. 
The news media consensus turns on ‘giving the people what it wants’, namely, news 
items that excite sensibilities, connect with the normative concerns of large sections of 
the population and confirm existing prejudices and stereotypes. The definition of a primary 
newsworthy story is an emotionally charged story that aligns with and arouses the 
righteously indignant ‘moral majority’. Crime, deviance and transgression are primary 
news stories because of the fascination, fear and outrage that they provoke. 
Young held that British society in the 1960s witnessed a media fuelled ‘deviance 
implosion’ that could trigger moral panics. As with the idea of ‘implosion’, he claimed 
‘moral panic’ from Marshall McLuhan. For McLuhan unparalleled, irreversible developments 
in mass communications were producing a mediatized age of anxiety and uncertainty 
with an instantaneous and global traffic in information. Human beings lived within 
and were reconstituted by an entertainment sensorium generating both obsessive fascination 
and a ‘moral panic’ (McLuhan, 1967: 89) of angst among cultural elites ‘pressing 
panic buttons every minute’ (McLuhan, 1967: 26). McLuhan identified three stages in 
the ‘panic’ reaction to the new media revolution: alarm; resistance; and exhaustion. In 
Young’s (1971: 181–182) reworking of the idea: 
 
“We are immensely aware of deviants in modern urban societies because of the constant 
 bombardment of information via the mass media … we can no longer have little knowledge of or 
at least conveniently forget the deviant. He is brought to our hearth by the television set, his 
picture is on our breakfast table with the morning paper. Moreover, the mass media do not purvey 
opinions on all deviant groups; they create a universe of discourse for our segregated social world 
in which many groups are ignored … The media then—in a sense—can create social problems; 
they can present them dramatically and overwhelmingly, and, what is most important, they can do 
it suddenly. What I am suggesting is that the media can fan up very quickly and effectively public 
indignation concerning a particular deviant group. It is possible for them to engineer rapidly what 
might call a moral panic about a certain type of deviancy. Indeed, because of the phenomenon of 
over-exposure—the glut of information over a short space on a topic so that it becomes 
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uninteresting—there is institutionalised into the media the need to create moral panics and issues 
which will seize the imagination of the public. 
 
The Drugtakers provides one of the first accounts of the influence exercised by news 
media on the thinking and practices of agencies of social control, particularly the police. 
Media initiated ‘moral panics’ have real effects producing ‘deviance amplification’ spirals 
that intensify both deviance and punitive official reactions to deviance, producing a 
self-fulfilling ‘translation of stereotypes into actuality, of fantasy into reality’ (Young, 
1971: 108–117). For Young (1971: 198–201), a central part of unfolding moral panics 
are news media campaigns that demand the restoration of moral order and a clampdown 
on deviants; attack those who would advocate progressive proposals on sensitive social 
issues like liberalizing drug laws; endorse the views of those who support the status quo; 
and pressure politicians and opinion leaders to distance themselves from progressive 
proposals. Such campaigns are conducted on behalf of the moral majority and generate 
moral alignment. 
 
The hippy drug taker was a deviant of considerable dramaturgical promise who, 
though numerically insignificant and relatively harmless, activated a significant moral 
panic by challenging the post-war status quo. The news media’s reporting of a hedonistic 
lifestyle touched a raw moral nerve among the ‘respectable’ moral majority, 
 
“fascinating because they act out in an uninhibited fashion the subterranean goals which the rest 
of the population desires, immediately condemnable because they do not deserve any of these 
rewards. They are a new leisured class; they exist in a limbo which is outside the workaday 
world of the mass of people. Moreover, they are particularly notorious because they espouse the 
use of drugs to achieve subterranean goals. And it is on hippy drug use that social reaction 
focuses … it is not psychotropic drugs per se that evoke condemnation, but their use for 
unreservedly hedonistic and expressive ends. Society reacts, then, not to the use of drugs but to 
the type of people who uses drugs; it reacts against the subterranean values of hippies and the 
use of drugs to attain these goals.”(Young, 1971: 149) 
 
The hippy lifestyle provoked moral indignation in the majority whose lives were governed 
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by conventional morality because it represented 
 
“a Dionysian culture: it puts extreme emphasis on sexual pleasure, physical euphoria and 
enjoyment. Moreover, it demands this pleasure now. It does not find the notion of pleasure in 
the future, deferred gratification, as being a worthwhile goal. This involves not only an emphasis 
on pleasure, but a totally different conception of time.” (Young, 1971: 150) 
 
Of course, this striking deviant lifestyle imaginary is one of the contradictions that the 
news media have to ‘resolve’. The commercial requirement to publish the most sensational 
details and the morally indignant reaction triggers a moral panic that threatens the 
image of a conformist society by publicizing and amplifying a seductively permissive 
lifestyle (Young, 1974: 245). Mediatized visibility inevitably generates more deviance 
because it provides potential deviants with information about how they should dress, 
think and behave. For all the moral opprobrium, the deviant master status is desirable. 
Importantly, reflexivity enables the news media to sense and articulate any decisive shift 
in the public mood permitting it to come to terms, for example, with the incorporation of 
the object of the moral panic into a commercialized popular cultural ‘revolution’: 
 
What is initially deprecated is also in the long run necessary in order to provide fuel for the 
leisure industries and copy for the art, music and fashion sections of the media. Here media and 
commerce combine to turn the execrable into the saleable—and thus resolve the contradiction. 
For the leisure industry, like the mass media, is constantly in search of the new and just as the 
media perform a symbolic diffusion of alternative realities, commerce delivered a more subtle 
blow—it buys the style of revolt, lock, stock and barrel.(Young, 1974: 252) 
 
In so doing the news media and commerce unintentionally transform the nature of the 
deviance, official reactions and the societal consensus. 
 
The Manufacture of News 
 
The conceptualization of the media presented in The Drugtakers formed the basis for 
Jock Young’s contribution to The Manufacture of News: Deviance, Social Problems and 
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the Mass Media , the 1973 volume he co-edited with Stan Cohen. However, in this seminal 
media criminology text, the idea of moral panics is not discussed or developed except 
for the recommendation that ‘a significant area for social research is to uncover the conditions 
under which the media are or are not successful in creating moral panics’ (Cohen 
and Young, 1973: 344). Given how central and energizing it was to his early work, it is 
surprising that Jock Young did not continue with news media and deviance research 
other than by reference to a book, Media as Myth, planned for 1975 publication but never 
materialized. It was left to Cohen (1972) and Hall et al. (1978) to incorporate and expand 
his ideas on ‘moral panic’ and ‘folk devils’. 
 
As Jock Young developed his version of Marxist criminology, he returned to and 
worked with the theme of ‘moral indignation’. For example, in ‘Working class criminology’ 
(Young, 1975: 79), he outlined his new realist position for taking the unfolding UK 
urban crime crisis seriously: 
 
“It is a simple fact that the majority of working-class crime is intra- and not inter-class in its 
choice of target, area of activity and distribution. Working-class people suffer from crime, 
confront daily the experience of material desperation, undergo the ravages of disorganization 
and competitive individualism. The ideology that plays on this—bourgeois ideology—contains 
an element of truth, and touches on the genuine interests of the class—albeit in a distorted 
fashion.” 
 
Hence, moral indignation about crime is connected to everyday experiences of injustice, 
inequality and exploitation and is not simply a ‘problem of mis-categorization and concomitant 
moral panics’ (Young, 1975: 89, 1979). An emergent left realism viewed ‘moral 
panic’ as a hindrance to critical analysis and the politics of hard knowledge. 
 
Left Realism 
 
 
In the ‘left realist’ manifesto ‘What Is to Be Done about Law and Order’, Lea and 
Young (1984; see also Kinsey et al., 1986; Young, 1983) condemned what they defined 
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as the ‘left idealist’ ‘moral panic theory of crime’ (1984: 31) that viewed the rising crime 
rate as a fabrication: 
 
Left idealism saw the official crime rate as used — intentionally or otherwise — by powerful 
groups such as the police and the media to create a ‘moral panic’, to mislead the public as to the 
real social problems they faced, and to divert attention away from the crimes of the powerful — 
including the police — towards seeing the poor as the main threat. This served as part of a 
conspiracy to blame the poor for poverty and to portray the rich and powerful as the protectors of 
society against crime. The war against crime was seen, largely, as an ideological smokescreen 
behind which the police could siphon off resources in their mobilization against the working class. 
(Young, 1984: 115) 
 
Lea and Young (1984: 49) argued for a ‘moral realism’ that understood that ‘the media 
are effective because they take real problems of everyday life and re-contextualise them 
in a framework which is supportive to the status quo’. The response of working class 
communities to predatory criminal victimization, in the form of fear, anger and a demand 
for punitive law and order policies was not an irrational, inappropriate, disproportionate 
over-reaction. For Lea and Young (1993: 264) the incredulous left idealist ‘it’s just a 
moral panic’ response had transformed ‘moral panic’ into a technique of neutralization 
that was deployed to deny the destructive impact of crime on working class communities. 
Liberal-left journalists were using the term in the same way and this had resulted in 
the under-reporting of the extent and nature of crime and anti-social behaviour in working 
class communities. Lea and Young also suggested that victim survey data indicated 
there should be a moral panic about the under-reported and under-recorded extent of 
violence again women and the consequences for society. 
 
Late Modern Moral Panics  
 
In a series of publications including the The Exclusive Society (1999) and The Vertigo 
of Late Modernity (2007b) Young offers a noticeably Mertonian-inspired structuralist 
reworking of ‘moral panic’. This view is subsequently developed in publications championing 
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‘cultural criminology’ (Ferrell et al., 2008; Young, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 
2011). Jock Young’s initial re-engagement with ‘moral panic’ was stimulated by 
McRobbie and Thornton’s (1995) trenchant critique of how ‘moral panic’ had been 
developed and used. They argued that as an explanatory concept, ‘moral panic’ was 
effectively exhausted because of the transition to a multi-mediatized, fragmented popular 
culture in which everyone was conscious and ‘knowing’ about what a moral panic 
was and how it was supposed to unfold. For McRobbie and Thornton moral panics could 
no longer be described as discrete events, having definite beginnings, stages and ends, in 
which the news media promote and society embraces and enforces a moral viewpoint. 
Many more moral panics arise because young people desire ‘authentic’ panics about 
their ‘inauthentic’ youth cultures; cultural industries attempt to incite panics for commercial 
reasons, and pressure groups attempt to instigate panics to mobilize public outrage. 
However, moral panics are also contested. Media debate whether something is or is 
not a moral panic, with a plurality of contradictory viewpoints and agents of social 
control conscious about needing not to over-react. It is much more difficult to trigger 
moral panics because hard and fast moral boundaries between ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ 
have broken down. Ideas of ‘conformity’, ‘public concern’ and ‘moral majority’ have 
altered so that much of what was once deemed to be deviance has been relativized and/ 
or normalized. It is practically impossible for a youth subculture to shock. Media literate 
‘folk devils’ desire to be recognized within the mass communication process, embracing, 
amplifying or defying, subverting and/or riding the wave of any media or public outrage. 
In such an environment, it is impossible to determine ‘real’ moral panics from ‘fake’ 
moral panics. 
 
Jock Young (1999: vii) agreed with much of this critique, not least because McRobbie 
and Thornton were making similar points about the commercial fetishization of youth 
subcultures to those that he made in 1971. While Young accepted that it is now more difficult 
to trigger major moral panics and create folk devils, he disagreed with McRobbie 
and Thornton’s belief that the ‘end’ of youth subcultures meant a ‘post’ moral panic 
society. For him, the opposite pertained. Extreme cultural strains and sharp contradictions 
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ensure that we now live in the era of the ‘permanent moral panic’ (Young, 2005: 
104). Moreover, Young insisted, contemporary moral panics are not misconstructions or 
distortions fabricated by the mass media with no connection to reality. On the contrary, 
the sheer number of ‘panics’ indicated, beyond sensational reporting, that raw nerves had 
been touched by accident or design, thereafter producing powerful social reactions: 
 
When moral panic occurs, then, it often involves a displacement of another fear, or a 
mystification of a deeper threat—but it is collective panic nonetheless, and if ‘read’ carefully, 
can teach us much about the cultural dynamics of fear and the structural crises that underlie it. 
Further it can reveal the degree to which such deep crises operate on the level of meaning, 
symbol, and emotion. (Ferrell et al., 2008: 50). 
 
The emotional strength of a ‘real’ late modern moral panic lies in its relationship to 
unprecedented structural and normative disruptions and convulsions in the post-social 
order. The subjects of the structural moral panic are not random: the group or event chosen 
as a focus of moral panic relates closely to, and is a symptom of, underlying anxieties. 
Not all ‘folk devils’ are arbitrarily selected as scapegoats, nor are folk devils 
necessarily blameless. Their behaviour can be deliberately provocative, seeking an 
equally intense reaction from news media and society (Young, 2011, p.253) 
 
Critically, moral indignation continues to lie at the source of contemporary moral panics. 
What has changed now is the focus of the moral panic and the fact that feelings of 
moral indignation affect a significant percentage of the population, crossing class boundaries. 
Jock Young’s move to New York allowed him to see and experience this shift most 
clearly and associate with the sociologically explosive fall-out from the imploding 
American Dream. A chaotic neo-liberal class structure has been constructed out of a morally 
corrosive ‘money for nothing’ and ‘bait and switch’ mentality that seemingly unites the 
‘unproductive’ classes—the underclass, the criminal class, the celebrity class, the uberwealthy 
and corporate elites. The lived experience of the squeezed working and middle 
employed classes consists of ‘an iron cage’ of harder work, further self-sacrifice, strict 
restraint and constrained rewards and opportunities. This hyper-strained, increasingly ontologically 
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insecure and anxious lived experience is contrasted with the seeming moral 
intransigence, defiance and impunity of others who live outside these constraints and pressures. 
What is truly significant is that mediatization ensures that we are all witnesses to the 
‘dream-world’ lifestyles of the rich and famous as well as that of the ‘welfare world’ of the 
underclass. This ‘sets off every trigger point of fear and desire’ (Young, 2007a: 43) in a 
significant segment of people panicked across class boundaries about their prospects. A 
generalized feeling of injustice, moral indignation, resentment and ‘righteous puritanical 
wrath’ are channelled towards those who attempt to ‘short circuit the whole marketplace of 
effort and reward’ (Young, 2007a: 45). This sense of relative deprivation and anomie is 
heightened daily by ‘a veritable chaos of reward, where wealth is seemingly distributed 
willy-nilly without rhyme or reason’ (Young, 1999: 152). 
 
The moral indignation of the ‘squeezed middle’ can focus on the outrageous unscrupulous 
behaviour of the wealthy as a few disgraced bankers, politicians and celebrities 
have found. However, for Young, the underclass remains a focal point of indignation 
because the middle classes are only too aware that their position in the social order is 
increasingly precarious amid ‘the ever present possibility of downward mobility, of a 
descent into the underclass, a loss of control, of dignity’ (Young, 2007a: 44). Media 
amplified caricatures of the underclass are the late modern folk devils ‘cast with the 
stigma of trouble, contamination and danger’ (Young, 2005: 104) and subject to the 
‘searchlight of condemnation, the object of stigmatisation, surveillance and blame’ 
(Young, 2005: 104): 
 
material and ontological precariousness is a fertile soil for projection and moralism. Social 
blame and recrimination ricochets throughout the social structure: single mothers, the 
underclass, blacks, new age travellers, junkies, crackheads—the needle spins and points to 
some vulnerable section of the community to whom we can apportion blame, and who can be 
demonised … Each day the normative contours of our society, in chat show, soap opera, news 
item or sport are discussed in intimate detail. At no time in human history have so many people 
gazed at so many others and has every normative nuance been so measuredly scrutinized. 
(Young, 1999: vii, vi). 
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The news media know intuitively there is ‘a ready market in agitating audiences; they 
themselves have institutionalised moral indignation with self-righteous enthusiasm’ 
(2007b: 49). Consequently a defining characteristic of late modernity is ‘trial by media’ 
television shows which mobilize audience feelings of outrage, resentment and disgust 
against a cast list of morally debased ‘others’ in the attempt to shore up ‘normality’ in a 
world which is increasingly morally uncertain.’ Such freak shows, founded as they are 
on indignation, intolerance, defiance, mortification, shame, humiliation and cruelty, are 
a profitable form of late modern mass entertainment. Identifying dangerous individuals 
has also become a key activity for the popular news media as has hunting ‘for the deviant 
way ahead of the police, and often hold the police responsible for inadequately dealing 
with the case’ (Young, 1999: 115). In this context, the ‘paedophile’ has become the most 
feared and reviled of late modern folk devils. Consequently, for Young, late modern 
moral panics accomplish a considerable amount of moral work, pinpointing, hardening 
and legitimizing social divisions and scapegoating, while also providing vengeful ‘naming 
and shaming’ entertainment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay has briefly charted Jock Young’s ambivalent relationship with the concept of 
‘moral panic’. The turn to cultural criminology facilitated final reconciliation with the concept 
that he had pioneered in 1971, rejected by 1980 and began to use again from the late 
1990s. Ferrell et al. (2008: 48) went so far as to declare that moral panic theory was ‘an 
essential model today for cultural criminologists and others … moral panic theory anticipates 
the phenomenology of transgression and vindictiveness’ that is at the heart of cultural 
criminology. His return to the sociology of crime and deviance also enabled Jock Young 
(2009: 13) to formulate his own classic retro-definition of a moral panic that can now sit 
alongside that of Stan Cohen. However, for me, it is his recognition of the potency of 
‘moral indignation’ (in all of its visceral manifestations like shock, resentment, outrage, 
injustice and righteous anger) and the issues and people that trigger such a reaction, rather 
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than ‘moral panic’, that unites Jock Young’s work from Notting Hill to Brooklyn Heights. 
If only he had written a book with the title of ‘Moral Indignation’. Equally important is 
Jock Young’s insistence that the social reaction to morally troubling incidents, issues and 
developments needs to be taken seriously and researched and understood on its own finegrained 
and often disconcerting terms rather than to be dismissed in a flippant, condescending 
fashion by academics, journalists and commentators as ‘just another moral panic’. 
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